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Two concepts of attachment to rules 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we discuss the implications of John Rawls’ (1955) paper “Two concepts 
of rules” for social science.  We argue that Rawls’ notion of ‘practice’ is not a 
straightforward contribution to sociological theory, but rather re-orients the idea of 
what understanding social actions might consist of. We explicate how Rawls’ 
distinction between ‘summary’ and ‘practice’ views of rules might play out in 
approaching mathematical practice and mathematical expressions.  We argue that 
social constructivists like Bloor hold on to a ‘summary’ conception of rules while 
Wittgenstein adopts the more radical ‘practice’ conception. 
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Two concepts of attachment to rules 
 
Introduction 
Half a century after John Rawls highlighted the notion of ‘practice’ for the 
understanding of action (Rawls 1955), it is questionable as to whether sociology has, 
as yet, understood what Rawls’ arguments meant for it, let alone caught up with 
Rawls.  As we understand its implications for sociology, Rawls’ notion of ‘practice’ – 
and the associated notion of ‘rule’ – does not mean business-as-usual, treating these 
notions as putative theoretical concepts which contribute to a schematic explanation 
of human action, but rather re-orients the idea of what understanding social actions 
might consist of.    
Rawls pointed to the difference between justifying an action within a practice and 
justifying a practice itself. Although Rawls’ explicit topic was moral philosophy, it is 
clear that his remarks are relevant to the social and human sciences in general. We 
wonder whether despite the recent ‘turn to practice’ (e.g., Schatzki et al., 2001) the 
lessons about the explanatory role of rules that could have been drawn from Rawls’ 
arguments have actually been taken.  In our view, there is still a widespread 
misunderstanding of the relation between actions that fall under a practice and the 
practice to which they belong. As we shall argue here, using the example of 
(elementary) mathematical practice, the re-orientation that Rawls proposed is not to 
be identified with or reduced to a concern for the ‘subjective meaning’ of action but 
involves an understanding of the forms that actions-in-practices take. 
Rawls: external versus internal justification 
In “Two concepts of rules”, Rawls (1955) engages in a defence of utilitarianism, in 
particular with respect to its connection with punishment and the obligation to keep 
promises. Rawls aims to show that in discussions surrounding utilitarianism, critics 
tend to confuse two different kinds of justification: 
In this paper I want to show the importance of the distinction between 
justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it, and 
Page 4 of 29 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2009). Two concepts of attachment to rules. Journal of Classical 
Sociology 9 (4), 405-427. 
 
I want to explain the logical basis of this distinction and how it is possible 
to miss its significance. (p.3; our emphasis) 
Rawls argues that actions done as part of a practice are justified by reference to the 
rules of that practice and that this kind of justification has to be differentiated from  
justifying the existence of the practice in the first place. Explaining why it is right that 
some individual is sent to jail is to be done in terms of the rules of the currently 
existing legal code, i.e., by mentioning the nature of the offence, the verdict, the rules 
of sentencing and the like (for example: convicted of aggravated assault there is a 
mandatory minimum sentence of three years).  It is a different matter to explain why 
people are put in jail at all (i.e., what the ‘point’ of jails is) and whether imprisonment 
is a useful, effective, or even desirable thing to be doing. What provides answers to 
the first question provides no answers to the second. 
In order to explain why philosophers overlook the differences between these two 
kinds of justification, Rawls introduces his two conceptions of rules: 
To explain how the significance of the distinction may be overlooked, I 
am going to discuss two conceptions of rules. One of these conceptions 
conceals the importance of distinguishing between the justification of a 
rule or practice and the justification of a particular action falling under it.  
The other conception makes it clear why this distinction must be made and 
what is its logical basis. (p.4) 
According to the first view, rules are seen as summaries of past cases, i.e., “[i]f a case 
occurs frequently enough one supposes that a rule is formulated to cover that sort of 
case” (p.19). With regard to the summary conception, particular cases are thus treated 
as logically prior to rules: 
We are pictured as recognizing particular cases prior to there being a rule 
which covers them, for it is only if we meet with a number of cases of a 
certain sort that we formulate a rule. Thus we are able to describe a 
particular case as a particular case of the requisite sort whether there is a 
rule regarding that sort of case or not. Put another way: what the A’s and 
the B’s refer to in rules of the form ‘Whenever A do B’ may be described 
as A’s and B’s whether or not there is the rule ‘Whenever A do B’, or 
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whether or not there is any body of rules which make up a practice of 
which that rule is a part.  (p. 22) 
In other words, under the summary conception rules are not seen as constitutive of the 
sense of A and B. In contrast, according to the practice conception, rules are treated as 
logically presupposed in the identity of particular cases, i.e., “are pictured as defining 
a practice” (p. 24):  
In the case of actions specified by practices it is logically impossible to 
perform them outside the stage-setting provided by those practices, for 
unless there is the practice, and unless the requisite properties are fulfilled, 
whatever one does, whatever movements one makes, will fail to count as a 
form of action which the practice specifies. (p. 25) 
According to the practice view, actions cannot be recognized as A and B 
independently of the rule. So, on this practice view, the rule comes before particular 
cases. Consequently, justifications of actions are internal to a practice: to characterise 
a particular action as ‘assault’ presupposes the justice system; similarly, to 
characterise the playing of a card as ‘drawing trump’ presupposes the rules of Bridge.   
Note that Rawls is not saying that there are no rules that fit the summary conception, 
but that the summary conception has been inappropriately treated as conceptualising 
rules in general. Many recipes and heuristics may fit the summary conception of rules 
(since a particular recipe for, e.g., cooking a chicken is not constitutive of what 
cooking a chicken consists of, but is rather a very good way of doing so, often based 
on past experiences), but not all rules have such a summary character, since other 
rules are actually constitutive of the practice they specify (cf., Garfinkel, 1963). Rawls 
argues that the summary conception hides that certain rules do not have a summary 
character, whereas the practice conception highlights that these kinds of rules do not 
regulate a pre-existing kind of action, but introduce the kinds of actions that the rules 
will subsequently regulate.   
A good way of illustrating the two different kinds or conceptions of rules is with 
respect to a game like chess.  The rules of chess which define, for example, how 
particular pieces can move and when a player is ‘checkmate’, are not summaries of 
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past actions of playing the game, but rather define those actions as moves within 
chess.  In contrast, chess strategies (for example, the different kinds of openings, such 
as the English Opening or the Sicilian Defence) are not constitutive of the game of 
chess at all, but rather are summaries of successful ways of playing (‘rules of 
preferred play’ in Garfinkel’s terms). 
Implications for social science 
Rawls’ distinction between two different conceptions of rules and his emphasis on the 
action-constitutive nature of a practice’s rules have not passed unnoticed in social 
science and have often enough been pointed out.  However, we wonder whether social 
science has not misunderstood what the consequences for its enterprise would be. The 
consequences are, we think, quite profound, and our effort here will be (another) 
exercise in clarification – to explain as clearly as possible, and to illustrate, what the 
implications for social science are. 
As already noted, Rawls’ argument is not that all rules are part of a practice (it is not 
his purpose to reject the summary view for all cases), but to show that the summary 
view of rules has inappropriately been taken as giving the general picture of all rules.  
Hence, it is certainly not necessary to make the reverse error and suppose that all 
activities are conducted under some practice. All that follows from Rawls’ argument 
is that a society features numerous practices and that the requirements for 
understanding actions within a practice differ from actions that fit the summary 
conception of rules (which differ, again, from those actions that are not actions-
according-to-a-rule).  
Rawls’ emphasis on the notion of practice is then not a straightforward contribution to 
sociological theory, but rather results in complications for finding answers to the 
question “Why are these people doing what they are doing?”.  Rawls highlights that 
answers to that question are not alike, since different kinds of actions afford different 
kinds of justification. Rawls turns attention to the question of “What are these people 
doing?” and the problems in (a) the identification of actions, and (b) the specification 
of the ‘(social) forms’ they take. 
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As Rawls makes plain, in many cases, a practice logically precedes its individual 
instances, i.e., the basis for identifying an action is given in and by the practice. The 
action is identifiable as a regular occurrence not on the basis of observing other 
actions, but on the basis of its relationship to the normal or standard ways of the 
practice. The capacity to identify actions-under-a-practice does not come from the 
observational enumeration (aggregation) of occurrences, but rather from 
understanding the application of the requirements of the practice in each case.    
This is not a matter of ‘taking the actors’ point of view’ in the sense of seeking their 
‘subjective’ views (cf., Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, 2008), but a matter of 
delineating their practical familiarity with the ‘action forms’ that the practice makes 
available.  For a canonical example, someone who recites “one, two, three, four, five, 
...” is obviously engaged in counting, and it is understood by all that this recitation has 
been given in a correctly ordered, predictably extensible sequence, i.e., that it is a 
reproduction of a standardised number system.  These understandings are available to 
us because we are familiar with the practice of counting and because we have a 
thoroughly practical grasp on the fact that carrying out such instant activities involves 
the employment of a number system. We can recognise the action forms of, for 
example, counting, counting by twos, or addition, since these are constituted by the 
standard number system that is institutionalised in the society.  The identity of an 
action-under-a-practice – what action it is – is then not a matter of ‘subjective 
understanding’, since what establishes the identity of an action is not the actor’s 
(subjective) intent per se, but whether or not what is done satisfies the requirements of 
the practice. For example, a sequence of 2, 4, 6, 8, 13 does not satisfy the 
requirements for ‘counting by twos’ regardless of the actor’s intent.  
Insofar as sociological theorising is concerned with actions, it then follows that the 
identification of actions in cases of actions-under-a-practice is not the privilege of the 
theorist, but is regulated by the ways of the relevant practice.  For example, what 
constitutes a ‘correct’ move in chess is not to be answered by the sociologist, but 
rather by reference to the rules of chess.  Consequently, the adequate identification of 
actions in such cases presupposes an understanding of the ways in which the practice 
operates.   
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The question then is not whether ‘practice’ might be an indispensable concept for 
sociological theory (it is clear that it is), but rather what the existence of practices 
implies for the project of social science.  Rawls did not pretend to reveal to 
philosophers the existence of legal practices (they already knew about them), but 
rather drew out the implications of the existence of different practices for making 
philosophical arguments about punishment and promises. Following Rawls, we would 
argue that sociologists are by virtue of their lives in the society and their reliance on 
their vernacular competences thoroughly familiar with a whole range of practices, but 
that they pervasively overlook (even though they presuppose) the existence of those 
practices in their ‘sociological’ discourse.   
Finally, following Garfinkel (1967) we want to note that the understanding of 
activities in terms of a practice is in no way something that is distinctively done by 
those who carry the professional title ‘sociologist’, since ordinary members as part of 
their activities have to identify what the relevant practice is in order to behave 
appropriately.  The implication for the project of social science is to move from the 
motivational question of “Why do people act in the way that they do?” to the 
‘procedural’ question of “How do they do the things they do?”  
Social constructivism 
Rawls’ position may seem very close to that of what is often referred to as ‘social 
constructivism’ in social science.  The aim of social constructivists (we will take 
Bloor as our example) is to counterpose contingency to necessity, i.e., to demonstrate 
that practices could be otherwise. Since our practices (including science and 
mathematics) are subject to socio-cultural variation, the social constructivist 
concludes that there is nothing necessary about the forms of our practices (in 
particular: we could have a different form of mathematics).  
Rawls seems to engage in a similar argument: by drawing a distinction between 
judgements within a legal system and the justification of that legal system, Rawls is 
simultaneously entertaining the possibility that there are different possible legal 
systems. Consequently, legal systems could be seen as not ‘natural’ but ‘social’ 
constructs, i.e., they could be (and often have been) otherwise. In our view, Rawls and 
the social constructivist do not differ on whether certain practices are customs, but 
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what implications can be drawn from this.  It is here that we feel that Rawls is (like 
Wittgenstein) much more radical than the social constructivist. 
For the social constructivist, the insight that a certain practice is a social custom is a 
destabilising one. Bloor (1994, p. 21) defines the task of the sociologist of knowledge 
as confronting general and institutionalised preconceptions about whether certain 
practices are customs by showing that they are (no more than?) conventional forms. In 
contrast, in our reading of Rawls, the realisation of the social nature of a practice does 
not carry destabilising implications, especially not revisionist ones for an ongoing 
practice. For example, Rawls’ argument does not seem to have implications for a 
particular legal practice (e.g., with respect to the verdicts that judges are handing 
down within a particular legal system).  Rather, Rawls’ reflections have implications 
for moral and legal philosophy, i.e., for analysts who conceptualise and evaluate legal 
systems. It this analytical job of thinking about practices that is being changed 
through Rawls’ arguments – not the actors’ practices (or their conceptions of those 
practices).   
Rawls complicates the analytical job of justifying practices by pointing to the 
different kinds of justification, in particular, the different offices that ‘do’ 
justifications: 
Is this person the legislator, or the judge, or the body of private citizens, or 
what? It is utterly crucial to know who is to decide such matters, and by 
what authority, for all of this must be written into the rules of the 
institution. Until one knows these things one doesn’t know what the 
institution is whose justification is being challenged; […]. (Rawls, 1955, 
p. 11) 
In other words, Rawls emphasises that with respect to justification it is important to 
bear in mind the kind of office that is doing the justification. In the case of legal 
practices, Rawls points to the difference between, in particular, the office of the judge 
and the legislator.  The former justifies a particular action (e.g., a sentence of five 
years jail time) in terms of the currently available legal rules, i.e., within the practice.  
In contrast, the legislator is reflecting about the purpose of certain legal practices in 
themselves, e.g., whether jail sentences are the right kind of punishment in the 21st 
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century.  According to Rawls, it is only in the context of this second kind of 
justification that arguments from the doctrine of utilitarianism can enter.  Put slightly 
differently, the office of the judge is relatively free from ‘philosophical’ arguments, 
whereas the office of the legislator might not be.  The question “Why are people put 
in jail?” is not a question that judges qua judges need or should address – but one that 
philosophers, and possibly legislators, might ask.  
When Rawls’ considerations are applied to mathematics, it is important to bear in 
mind that there is no equivalent office to that of the legislator or reformer.  In our 
view, the two most important ‘offices’ to consider are the everyday user and the 
philosopher of mathematics.  The question “Why does 2 + 2 = 4?” will ask for 
different kinds of ‘justification’ from each.  The user will presumably simply point 
out that this is how calculation is defined.  In contrast, the philosopher may be 
tempted to interpret the question as asking “What makes mathematical propositions 
true?”. In other words, we think that Rawls’ focus on the practice of punishment may 
enable the wrong sort of conclusion to be drawn about the more general application of 
his conception of practice.  In the case of punishment, not only is there the practice, 
but there is also a demand for justification (“Why are people put in jail?”) and 
disagreements over whether the practice is called for (“Are jail sentences justified?”). 
The same situation does not, however, apply with other practices such as, e.g., driving 
on the left/right or playing chess: when they are done as expected no justification is 
required. 
In our view, Rawls argues for what has come to be referred to as a non-foundationalist 
treatment of practices, whereas social constructionists’ conceptions of practice tend to 
be more continuous with those of foundationalism. In other words, social 
constructivists assume that practices presuppose basic justifications, ones which 
motivate participants’ attachment to the practice.  According to this view, people 
engage in a given socio-cultural practice because they believe that that practice is 
right. In line with a long-standing sociological conviction, social constructivists 
suppose that the justifications of practices are effected by naturalising the practice. In 
other words, it is assumed that people suppose that a particular practice is ‘right’, 
because it is in the nature of things.  This accounts for social constructivists’ critical 
Page 11 of 29 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2009). Two concepts of attachment to rules. Journal of Classical 
Sociology 9 (4), 405-427. 
 
preoccupation with (philosophical) doctrines which seek to show that practices (e.g., 
science or mathematics) are grounded in some external source (e.g., in reality or 
logic).  Social constructivists are further inclined to treat those philosophical doctrines 
as equivalent to the beliefs of actors engaged in that practice.  For example, ‘realism’ 
is pervasively treated as the working philosophy of practicing scientists (e.g., Barnes 
et al., 1996, p. 81) – whereas mathematicians are characterised as subscribers to 
Platonism or Formalism (e.g., Davis and Hersh, 1981, p. 312).  Social constructivists 
thus suppose that showing that a practice is not grounded ‘in the nature of things’ will 
potentially destabilise it.  In contrast, Rawls’ separation of the two forms of 
justification gives grounds for questioning the supposition that people are attached to 
a practice by virtue of a foundational justification.   
In the following we will try to show how the failure to distinguish summary from 
practice conceptions of rules leads David Bloor into a suspect foundationalist account 
of mathematics as a social practice (Bloor 1973, 1976, 1983, 1994, 1997). To 
illustrate the general argument we will focus on his treatment of the question of 
whether 2 plus 2 must equal 4 (Bloor, 1994; Barnes et al., 1996, Chapter 7). 
Bloor: the conventional character of mathematics 
Bloor’s overall aim is to demonstrate the conventional character of mathematical 
knowledge: 
Sociologists are professionally concerned with the conventional aspects of 
knowledge. So I will try to identify the conventional components of the 
concepts ‘2’ and ‘4’ and ‘addition’. Conventions are shared ways of acting 
that could in principle be otherwise. […] Demonstrating conventionality 
therefore involves demonstrating alternative possibilities. (Bloor, 1994, p. 
21) 
For Bloor, any insistence that 2 + 2 must equal 4 seems to be an expression of a 
universalist conception of mathematics, which for him is as misguided as the view 
that a particular country’s rules of traffic are universal (rather than local). Bloor’s goal 
is to show that the equation ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is not universal (as, he assumes, it seems to the 
members of society), but only conventional.   
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Bloor thinks that people’s belief in the universality of mathematical expressions 
means that, whenever they are called upon to complete ‘2 + 2 = ’ they will assume 
that they have no freedom of choice, i.e., no alterative but to write 4.  If Bloor is able 
to demonstrate that mathematical expressions are conventional, then he believes this 
would show them that there is no actual constraint on what they do, i.e., that they 
could answer 0, 3, or 72 and that the seeming necessity to write 4 was only a socially 
created illusion.  
Bloor’s starting point is a self-declared finitist conception of mathematics (e.g., 1994, 
p. 25; 1997, Chapter 2) that argues that the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is empirically 
demonstrable, but that its truth is only assured as far as it has been demonstrated.  In 
other words, the correctness of 2 + 2 = 4 rests only on an aggregate sample of cases 
(although 2 + 2 = 4 purports to be correct in all cases). There is thus no sound basis 
for confidence that the rule must turn out to apply in all hitherto unexamined 
instances.  
For Bloor it is obvious that mathematical expressions are not universal, but he seems 
puzzled as to why so many people believe that they are. In other words, Bloor seeks to 
understand what it is that makes people believe that 2 + 2 must equal 4. Bloor thinks 
that there are two mistaken doctrines which encourage the view that mathematical 
expressions are universal, namely empiricism and logicism.  That is to say, Bloor 
thinks that most people who have to justify why 2 + 2 equals 4 would hold, either, 
that the equation expresses an empirical fact about nature, or, that it expresses a 
logical principle.  Bloor’s aim is to show that neither empiricism nor logicism 
provides a justification for 2 + 2 = 4, and that arithmetic is therefore conventional. 
Bloor thus extends Mannheim’s project of demonstrating the existential determination 
of knowledge to mathematics:  
The existential determination of thought may be regarded as a 
demonstrated fact in those realms of thought in which we can show […] 
that the process of knowing does not actually develop historically in 
accordance with immanent laws, that it does not follow from the ‘nature of 
things’ or from ‘pure logical possibilities’ […].  (Mannheim, 1936, p. 239) 
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Following Mannheim, Bloor wants to show that 2 + 2 = 4 neither follows from the 
‘nature of things’ (empiricism) nor from ‘pure logical principles’ (logicism). 
First, Bloor addresses the question whether 2 + 2 = 4 might be an empirically 
grounded truth, i.e., a reflection of an immutable fact of nature. To demonstrate the 
falsehood of that idea, Bloor invites us to imagine someone who initially accepts the 
universal truth of 2 + 2 = 4 (on the basis of counting apples, cows, etc.), but then, in 
an experimental spirit, decides to test out this truth on a plurality of further cases.  In 
many cases, 2 + 2 = 4 works, but is it not presumptuous to suppose that because, so 
far, 2 + 2 have turned out to equal 4, it must always do so? 
Bloor gives an example designed to show that, in an inductive spirit, one might find a 
case in which it just does not turn out that way.  Imagine encountering a wheel that is 
segmented into four bits marked ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’.  Try adding these numbers! 
How does one do that?  Treat rotation of the wheel as ‘addition’, so that, positioning 
the wheel at the starting point 0 one can move the wheel through two points, and treat 
that as ‘adding 2’.  Therefore 0 ‘add’ 2 ‘equals’ 2, in symbols: 0 + 2 = 2.  Similarly, 0 
+ 1 = 1 (starting at position 0 moving one position) and 1 + 2 = 3 (starting at position 
1 moving two positions), confirming earlier ‘hypotheses’. However, what happens if 
we start from position 2 and move through two further points? In Bloor’s (1994, p. 
26) own words: “we make the inevitable discovery: we set the wheel at 2, and then 
turn it to so as to add a further 2, and we get back to zero. 2 + 2 = 0.”  
The number wheel example (which is really arithmetic modulo 4) for Bloor falsifies 
the empirical hypothesis that 2 + 2 is always 4. According to Bloor, one is now faced 
with the problem that in many situations 2 + 2 = 4, but in some situations 2 + 2  4. 
What is to be done?   
According to finitism, there is no ‘correct’ response implicit in what went 
before. It isn’t a case of ‘discovering’ the right status to accord the 
discovery that 2 + 2 can add up to something other than 4.  It is a case of 
deciding.  The existing state of culture, the context around the new result, 
and the interests that inform our practices, will all impinge on the decision. 
(Bloor, 1994, pp. 26-27). 
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That is to say, the truth of 2 + 2 = 4 is not justified empirically, because 2 + 2 = 0 on 
the number wheel also corresponds to the ‘nature of things’. It is therefore not nature, 
but society, through its conventions, that determines that 2 + 2 equals 4 (and not 0). 
Bloor is aware that he has so far only ‘refuted’ empiricism. What about the possibility 
that 2 + 2 = 4 follows from ‘pure logical possibilities’? 
Now for the second obstacle. This concerns proofs. Surely if we can prove 
that 2 + 2 = 4, then all this talk of ‘discretion’, and ‘moving from case to 
case’, as if each step were creative and problematic, must be wrong. 
(Bloor, 1994, p. 27) 
Bloor investigates attempts to prove 2 + 2 = 4 formally. Such proofs are part of 
relatively recent developments in mathematics and belong to a field variously known 
as metamathematics, the foundations of mathematics, or formalism. Bloor, following 
Mackie (1966) argues that formal proofs of 2 + 2 = 4 do not succeed for they rely on 
the very result they aim to prove:1  
It shows us that these same conventional procedures or techniques are 
presupposed by the rigorous proof. Rather than this proof representing 
some principle of knowing, or some avenue to knowledge, that is superior 
to the conventionalized procedures of arithmetic, it presupposes them. 
(Bloor, 1994, p. 29) 
Bloor has thus demonstrated the inadequacy of the two standard justifications that 2 + 
2 has to equal 4. The equation neither follows from the ‘nature of things’ nor from 
‘pure logical possibilities’ and, he argues, is consequentially existentially determined, 
i.e., a conventional matter. 
                                                 
1 We do not discuss the technical details of this discussion, since we agree with Bloor that formal 
proofs of 2 + 2 = 4 fail to provide a justification for that equation. As will become clear, our 
disagreement concerns the question in which sense 2 + 2 = 4 can be justified in Bloor’s terms in the 
first place. 
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The summary view of mathematical expressions 
Bloor rightly treats 2 + 2 = 4 as a rule.  However, as Rawls points out, the important 
question is to discern what kind of rule this might be. 
Bloor self-avowedly adopts a finitist conception of rules, i.e., for him a rule is 
justified by the applications of the rule so far. So far the calculations have conformed 
to the rule, but there can be no evidence that this will be so in the next case, or the one 
after that.  It should be clear that Bloor’s finitist conception is equivalent to what 
Rawls terms the summary view of rules, which is characterised by assuming that “[i]f 
a case occurs frequently enough one supposes that a rule is formulated to cover that 
sort of case” (Rawls, 1955, p. 19). This is Bloor’s position, since he asks us to 
imagine that the rule 2 + 2 = 4 is a result of having performed a number of counting 
activities in the world (e.g., putting apples together) and since it was (always? nearly 
always?) the case that two apples put together with two apples gave four apples, we 
have formed the rule 2 + 2 = 4. In other words, the number wheel example imagines a 
person who has so far only encountered particular cases where 2 + 2 = 4, and who is 
therefore surprised when he or she ‘discovers’ that there can be cases where 2 + 2  4.  
Bloor further presupposes that those who participate in the practice of arithmetic do 
so on the basis of such a summary view, i.e., they suppose that because the rule has so 
far applied, it will continue to do so.  The number wheel example is Bloor’s attempt to 
show that not only is there no logical necessity to make this assumption, but that it is 
also factually incorrect. 
Bloor’s view of mathematical expressions shares three properties that Rawls 
identified as being characteristic of a summary conception of rules: 
1.  The point of having rules derives from the fact that similar cases tend 
to recur and that one can decide cases more quickly if one records past 
decisions in the form of rules. (Rawls, 1955, p. 22) 
In the case of mathematics, the similar cases concern instances of ‘adding things 
together’; the rule 2 + 2 = 4 is formed as a result of the fact that previously when we 
have  put two things together with another two things we get four things. 
Page 16 of 29 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2009). Two concepts of attachment to rules. Journal of Classical 
Sociology 9 (4), 405-427. 
 
2.  The decisions made on particular cases are logically prior to rules. […] 
We are pictured as recognizing cases prior to there being a rule which 
covers them, for it is only if we meet with a number of cases of a certain 
sort that we formulate a rule. (p. 22) 
Bloor’s picture of the formation of mathematical rules sees the particular cases as 
independent and prior to arithmetic systems.  ‘Adding’ in the apple case and the 
number wheel case are seen as the same activity of ‘counting’ independent of and 
prior to the system of arithmetic that is being applied. In other words, Bloor argues 
that from doing the same thing one can get different results (whereas our point will be 
that in the two examples one is not doing the same thing).  
3. Each person is in principle always entitled to reconsider the correctness 
of a rule and to question whether or not it is proper to follow it in a 
particular case. (p. 23) 
Bloor’s example of the number wheel is not meant as the discovery of a new kind of 
game/practice, but rather a reflection on the correctness of the rule 2 + 2 = 4. Bloor is 
using the example to get the reader to question whether this rule should be followed in 
the case of the number wheel.  The overall message is a critical one: “You might have 
thought that you have always had to accept that 2 + 2 = 4, but now you should realise 
that there cases where 2 + 2  4.  Therefore it is up to you (or society) to decide 
whether you want to accept that 2 + 2 = 4.” 
The practice view of mathematical expressions 
Rawls has provided a basis for recognising that the summary conception of 
mathematical expressions might neither be the necessary, nor even the best view.  
How is the practice conception to be applied to mathematics?  Here Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on mathematics (e.g., 1976, 1978) provide something very like Rawls’ 
account of the relation of utilitarianism to legal practices. 
For Wittgenstein, a number of philosophical confusions arise from the temptation to 
treat every expression of an ostensibly propositional form as a proposition. In the case 
of mathematics, it is clear that mathematical expressions have some similarities to 
empirical propositions and in some contexts function as such. However, for 
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Wittgenstein, it is an error to suppose that mathematical expressions always function 
as empirical propositions that can be readily characterised as being either true or false: 
We are used to saying “2 times 2 is 4”, and the very “is” makes this into a 
proposition, and apparently establishes a close kinship with everything we 
call a ‘proposition’. Whereas it is a matter only of a very superficial 
relationship. (Wittgenstein, 1978, I, Appendix III, §4) 
Rather than thinking of mathematical expressions as (empirical) propositions, 
Wittgenstein asks us to see them as rules or norms.  Expressions such as 2 + 2 = 4 
might superficially invite identification as a proposition, but in most situations 
function as a rule (as the instruction: “whenever you come across 2 + 2 = then write 
4”). 2 Put slightly differently, mathematical expressions do not constitute descriptions 
about anything, but rather provide the forms in which descriptions may be cast: 
[…] the mathematical proposition is only supposed to supply a framework 
for a description. (Wittgenstein, 1978, VII, §2) 
What I want to say is: mathematics as such is always measure, not thing 
measured. (Wittgenstein, 1978, III, §75) 
That is to say, we can use mathematics to form descriptions – but mathematical 
expressions themselves are not descriptive.  
                                                 
2 Wittgenstein is not saying that mathematical propositions are rules rather than propositions. He does 
not think that there is a single correct characterisation of mathematical expressions. Rather, 
Wittgenstein wants to draw attention to the differences between “2 + 2 = 4” and “There is a cat on the 
mat” and the danger of treating mathematical expressions always as a type of fact stating proposition. 
Wittgenstein (1976, p.251) remarks: “Of course you can say mathematical propositions are about 
numbers. But if you do, you are almost sure to be in a muddle. Because you don’t see that what is 
about 2 in the sense in which a proposition is about a sofa, is never a mathematical proposition. […] I 
don’t say it is wrong to say that mathematical propositions are about numbers, that the other way of 
speaking is right. I only want to point it out. Because unless you see there are the two ways – you are 
likely to be misled.” 
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Good examples are systems of measurement, such as the metric or Imperial one. 
These measurement systems are not descriptive themselves, but can be used for 
descriptions (it is not in the nature of things to be either metres or feet in length, but 
measurement in feet or metres does state the length of, e.g., a sofa). Wittgenstein 
(1953, §50) notoriously denied that the question “Is the standard metre in Paris one 
metre long?” is an empirical one. The reason for Wittgenstein’s denial is that the 
expression “The ‘standard metre’ is one metre long.” may look just like an empirical 
proposition (which is either true or false), but its function in the metric system is not 
that of an empirically testable claim, but rather than of a stipulation: whether anything 
is a metre long is to be decided by matching it against the standard metre. In 
Wittgenstein’s words: “In this language-game it is not something that is represented, 
but is a means of representation” (1953, §50). In Rawls’ terms, the standard metre has 
to be treated as constitutive of the practice of measuring-in-metres. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks about the standard metre are meant to illustrate his general 
warning that many statements only misleadingly resemble empirical propositions. 
Rather than just looking at the form of statements, he invites us to pay attention to 
their sense and to note that, for example, the sense of “That table is two metres 
eighteen centimetres long.” is very different from the sense of “The standard metre is 
one metre long.”. The first might be either an empirical hypothesis or the report of a 
measurement (depending on whether it comes before or after the measurement being 
made), whilst the second is neither a hypothesis nor a report of measurement using the 
metric system, but is itself (insofar as it makes sense at all) part of the metrical 
measurement system. It is something said in explaining how the metric system works 
and as such it is a stipulation of what the definitive standard of metric measurement 
is: 
A thing cannot be at the same time measure and the thing measured. 
(Wittgenstein, 1978, I, §40, footnote 1) 
If you measure a table with a yardstick, are you also measuring the 
yardstick? If you are measuring the yardstick, then you cannot be 
measuring the table at the same time. (1978, III, §74) 
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The metric system itself does not dictate that the length of the table is two metres 
eighteen centimetres, but rather details what sorts of measuring operations will yield a 
correct measurement of the table (where the results of those measuring operations will 
depend upon the table being measured). An understanding of how the metric system 
works as a means of measurement thus enters into the sense of claims about the length 
of the table. The metric system is a standard of correctness, and standards of 
correctness are in themselves neither correct nor incorrect, but are rather presupposed 
in determinations of what is and is not correct.  
Wittgenstein adopts a practice conception of mathematical expressions, which has the 
features that Rawls specifies: 
In contrast with the summary view, the rules of practices are logically 
prior to particular cases.  This is so because there cannot be a particular 
case of an action falling under a rule of a practice unless there is the 
practice. (Rawls, 1955, p. 25) 
Bloor proceeds as if we can talk of ‘adding’ and ‘totalling’ without specifying a 
practice. However, if one reflects on the details of the number wheel example, one 
can see that Bloor has not described a case in which counting according to 2 + 2 = 4 
has failed, but rather has set up a different practice using some of the notations 
employed in another practice. The number wheel, rather than providing counter-
evidence for the certainty in our belief that 2 + 2 = 4, simply is the ‘discovery’ of 
another practice – which has a peculiar relation to our original practice, namely that it 
utilizes the same symbols.  This resembles the realisation that with a deck of cards we 
cannot only play Bridge, but also Poker. However, this realisation has no implications 
for either Bridge or Poker.  
Bloor’s number wheel example demonstrates that a lot of ground-work has to be done 
in order to introduce ‘numbers’ (rather than mere symbols) which can be used to 
‘add’. Rawls illustrates this in the following way: 
Many of the actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by 
oneself or with others whether there is the game or not.  For example, one 
can throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood.  But one 
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cannot steal base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an error, or balk; 
although one can do certain things which appear to resemble these actions 
such as sliding into a bag, missing a grounder and so on.  Striking out, 
stealing a base, balking, etc., are all actions which can only happen in a 
game. No matter what a person did, what he did would not be described as 
stealing a base or striking out or drawing a walk unless he could also be 
described as playing baseball, and for him to be doing this presupposes the 
rule-like practice which constitutes the game. The practice is logically 
prior to particular cases: unless there is the practice the terms referring to 
actions specified by it lack a sense. (p. 25) 
The same applies to mathematics: of course we can do things with apples that 
resemble counting.  We can put them together, and divide them, etc.  However, if we 
are counting or calculating then we can do so only within a system of arithmetic.  We 
cannot ask whether 2 + 2 = 4 without specifying (or presupposing, as normal users 
do) a standard or practice, since it is the standard or practice that specifies what counts 
as correct.  
Bloor treats the activity ‘counting’ as the same in the case of ‘counting apples’ and 
‘counting on the number wheel’.  However, the numbers on the number wheel 
function not like a quantity, but more as a position, akin to house numbers (but adding 
number 12 to next door’s number 14 does not yield 26 houses).  ‘2’ on the number 
wheel does not signify an amount, but rather a position or location. Furthermore, one 
can count (in the standard sense) the number of points on the number wheel: there are 
four of them. Finally, one can count cumulatively the number of points through which 
the wheel cycles: eight points is two complete revolutions (although it would be 
represented in Bloor’s notation as 0  +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 = 0). In sum, the 
number wheel does not establish Bloor’s point that one does not have to give the 
prescribed answer 4 to the equation 2 + 2 = , i.e., that one could as well give another 
answer, e.g., 0.  Bloor’s number wheel is simply a different kind of arithmetic 
(arithmetic modulo 4), but in that system the answer is no less inexorable than is 4 in 
the standard case.   
Bloor treats the necessity of arithmetic systems as though it were an extraneous and 
supernumerary feature of them, as though one could learn, first, the number system, 
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and subsequently require the conviction that the operations must be strictly respected, 
when, with such arithmetics, the rigorous nature of the rules is part of defining the 
practice (learning to count is learning to recite the numbers in fixed sequence).  
Rawls’ practice conception of rules highlights this feature of mathematical 
expressions: 
The practice view leads to an entirely different conception of the authority 
which each person has to decide on the propriety of following a rule in 
particular cases.  To engage in a practice, to perform those actions 
specified by a practice, means to follow the appropriate rules.  If one 
wants to do an action which a certain practice specifies then there is no 
way to do it except to follow the rules which define it.  Therefore, it 
doesn’t make sense for a person to raise the question whether or not a rule 
of practice correctly applies to his case where the action he contemplates 
is a form of action defined by a practice.  If someone were to raise such a 
question, he would simply show that he didn’t understand the situation in 
which he was acting.  If one wants to perform an action specified by a 
practice, the only legitimate question concerns the nature of the practice 
itself (“How do I go about making a will?”). (p. 26) 
Bloor seems to conflate Rawls’ two different kinds of justifications (of a particular 
action within a practice and the practice itself).  In the case of mathematics this is 
equivalent to two different kinds of necessity. As Wittgenstein (1976, p. 241) 
remarks:  “[w]e must distinguish between a necessity in the system and a necessity of 
the whole system”.  Within a particular arithmetic, the answer is inexorable – 
however, there is no necessity in adopting a particular kind of arithmetic in the first 
place.  
Bloor’s objective is to show that a ‘sociological’ explanation of the necessity (or, 
more precisely, the apparent necessity) of 2 + 2 = 4 is called for. In contrast, we have 
been arguing that the need for sociological explanation in Bloor’s sense is itself only 
an apparent necessity.  Our disagreement with Bloor is not over the appropriateness or 
otherwise of giving a sociological explanation of practices, but with something rather 
more specific, namely, Bloor’s conception of the form that sociological explanation 
must take. We have tried to show that Bloor’s sees a need for such sociological 
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explanation as a result of not distinguishing sharply enough between the necessity 
within a particular example arithmetic (i.e., that 2 + 2 = 4 on the number wheel) and 
the necessity of adopting a particular arithmetic (e.g., ‘number wheel arithmetic’), i.e., 
between what Rawls called “justifying a practice” and “justifying a particular action 
falling under it”.   
Two concepts of attachment 
In our view, Bloor’s interpretation is far from idiosyncratic, since it is a very 
widespread assumption across social science that individuals engage in practices on 
the basis of the beliefs they hold about those practices (this is, after all, the key 
supposition of the critique of ideology since Marx at least, which argues that these 
practices impose themselves by virtue of their apparent natural necessity). Such 
beliefs, it is often assumed, lead to the practice in question being experienced as 
necessitated by the essential nature of things and therefore immutable and universal.  
Sociologists have argued that this kind of attachment is a result of people 
‘naturalising’ a practice’s local ways, conceiving these as being in accord with the 
very nature of things and therefore universal (see Abercrombie et al., 1986, for a rare 
critique of this supposition). One prominent task of social science is thus to unmask 
this mistaken ‘naturalness’ of people’s beliefs. 
Bloor gives the following motivation for his sociological project: 
Institutions and norms are more than dispositions and expectations. They 
are also the focus of attitudes and bring forth potent images. Wittgenstein 
takes account of this when he says: “Our children are not only given 
practice in calculation but are also trained to adopt a particular attitude 
towards a mistake in calculating.” […] The attitude is typified by the 
feeling that the calculation goes its own way, though the calculator may 
lapse. The theories of mathematics that Wittgenstein is opposing mistake 
this attitude for the whole of the reality that they are trying to explain. For 
institutions such as the law or the monarchy this confusion […] would be 
a case of mistaking an ideology for the reality that it seeks to legitimate. 
Perhaps the same should be said here too.  (Bloor, 1973, p. 189) 
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Bloor is saying that people have a particular ‘attitude’ toward arithmetic, which sees 
equations such as 2 + 2 = 4 as natural.3 While Marx criticised classical economists for 
universalising the economic categories of capitalism, Bloor wants to demonstrate that 
people have universalised ‘their’ arithmetic in much the same way. Bloor thus aims  
to show that people’s attachment to arithmetic is as ideological as their attachment 
toward, e.g., the monarchy.  
According to Bloor, learning a practice consists of two (independent) things: (1) an 
understanding of the rules of that practice; (2) acquiring an attachment or commitment 
to the rules of that practice as the natural, correct, or only way of doing things. The 
important consideration for Bloor clearly is (2). When Bloor compares the rules of 
traffic (e.g., driving on the left) with the rules of arithmetic (e.g., base ten arithmetic), 
the difference for Bloor lies not in the difficulty of learning them, but in the kind of 
attachment people have to them. As Bloor understands it, is easier for people to 
acknowledge that things ‘could be otherwise’ in the case of rules of traffic than in the 
case of rules of arithmetic, i.e., Bloor thinks that people are attached in a different 
way to the rules of traffic than they are to the rules of arithmetic, so that whilst  
people realise that the rules of traffic are conventional, they are in denial about the 
conventional status of arithmetic. 4   
Bloor’s arguments are not therefore an attack on the result of adding 2 and 2 (and 
getting 4), but an attempt to loosen our attachment to that result, i.e., an attack on our 
inability to acknowledge that 2 + 2 could equal 3, 0, or 65 (which according to Bloor 
arises from the naturalising illusion we have about the practice).  The point of the 
number wheel example is not to show that people have made mistakes when counting 
apples or cows, but that they were misguided about the inevitability of the equation 2 
                                                 
3 In contrast, we think that Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘attitude’ in the passage quoted by Bloor is 
more one of, e.g., stringent intolerance toward mistakes rather than a belief in the ‘naturalness’ of 
arithmetic. 
4 This, in our view, is a move made by many of those that claim that, for example, logic, grammar, or 
arithmetic are culturally relative (see Greiffenhagen and Sharrock, 2006a,b, 2007). 
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+ 2 = 4. Similarly, in his discussion of mathematical proofs, Bloor is not finding 
mistakes in previous proofs, but is questioning in which sense these proofs are 
absolute foundations for mathematical statements. 
Bloor’s target is people’s alleged beliefs in the universality of mathematics (e.g., that 
2 + 2 must in all circumstances equal 4).  However, Bloor makes the conflation that 
Rawls warned against, between justifying a whole practice and justifying an action in 
the terms of a practice. That is to say, Bloor confuses two different senses of ‘must’, 
namely (i) that we must use this arithmetic system, and (ii) that when using this 
arithmetic system the constitutive equations must hold.  We may ask whether we 
should apply the ‘ordinary’ rules of arithmetic in any particular situation, but that 
question is independent from asking whether 2 + 2 must equal 4 within ordinary 
arithmetic. 
Bloor has amplified, rather than eliminated, the confusion surrounding the fact that 2 
+ 2 must equal 4, by treating every insistence on this as if it involves an assumption 
about the uniqueness of this number system, regardless of whether this insistence 
originates with a philosophical realist or an everyday user of calculations. We have 
tried to show that it is perfectly possible for people to hold that 2 + 2 necessarily 
equals 4 without manifesting attachment to, or needing emancipation from, an 
ideologically universalising conception of the number system, since they can be seen 
as simply expressing their correct understanding of the number system in which that 
equation appears.   
This can be illustrated by the fact that someone who initially replies affirmatively to 
the question “Is 2 plus 2 always 4?” and is then shown the number wheel example, is 
not likely to respond with shock and awe (as one might expect after the unmasking of 
an ideology), but rather with mild amusement (“ah, what a nice little trick – yeah, I 
now see why you can say that 2 plus 2 does not always equal 4 – but of course this 
has no consequence for the calculations that I encounter every day”). Thus in our 
view the supposed belief in the universality of 2 + 2 = 4 is not an expression of an 
ideology that has to be unmasked, but rather a function of the ubiquity of that 
arithmetic that features this equation in the everyday affairs of our society. Like 
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Rawls’ examples from baseball, it constitutes its own objects independently of other 
practices. 
People may be said to be ‘attached’ to playing particular games with symbols rather 
than others – but that does not mean that they therefore must conclude that this is the 
only thing that can be done with these symbols. In other words, our ‘attachment’ to 2 
+ 2 = 4 resembles the attachment of a professional Bridge player to the rules of 
Bridge, or the attachment of a member of one culture to certain cultural practices 
(e.g., forms of greeting or types of food). The rules of Bridge, traffic, or of a particular 
number system are not ‘natural’ (in contrast to ‘cultural’), but that does that mean that 
we cannot feel deeply attached to them. “This is the only way to do it” (e.g., “Bridge 
is the only game there is.”) in many situations is not an ontological remark (claiming 
that other ways of doing things are inconceivable), but an expression of a strong 
preference for or entrenched attachment to that way of doing things (“I know there are 
other ways of doing things, but I really don’t like them”).  
This can be clarified by noting that ‘our’ system is simply the one with which 
everyone in our society is familiar (which has led us to label the number system in 
which 2 + 2 does, and must, equal 4 the ‘default’ or ‘standard’ number system). That 
number system does not gain its default status from any mathematical properties, but 
from the fact that it is widely institutionalised throughout our society, where it plays a 
multifunctional role.  It is the number system which almost everyone is socialised into 
early childhood – the one taught by times tables, built into early reading books, etc. 
As a result of its pervasiveness this system functions as the default system for 
identifying basic calculations. It is not that we cannot imagine other arithmetical 
system or even suppose that it is the only number system in commonplace use in our 
society (for example, we are all aware of modulo arithmetic in at least the form of the 
12-hour clock, where 12 = 0), but rather that, all other things being equal, we will 
assume that this is the number system in play.    
To give an analogy: If we have some cards in our hands and someone plays a Queen 
of Spades, we would not know what card to play next – without being told which 
game is being played. In contrast, if we see “7 + 8  = ” written on a blackboard we 
would typically give 15 as the ‘natural’ answer. ‘Natural’, that is, not because of any 
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metaphysical commitment to ‘our’ arithmetic, but simply because this system has 
something of a default status in our society. Consequently, someone who is asked 
whether 2 + 2 must always equal 4 is entitled to assume that they are being questioned 
within the default system of arithmetic, and is therefore right to conclude, on the basis 
of that assumption, that it does. Equally, if we were to tell someone, as a bare 
statement of fact, without context or explanation, that it is arithmetically correct that 
12 = 0 and 5 = 9, we might tempt people into denying that this could be so.  However, 
we could easily point out to them that they already accept just these equations without 
demur in the course of their practical lives by making clear that these equations hold 
in the familiar contexts of the 12-hour clock (12 = 0) and in terms of time zone 
comparisons between London and New York (5 = 9) respectively. These observations 
highlight that use of a particular number system in accord with its internal necessities 
does not preclude nor conflict with the comfortable, largely thoughtless, use of other 
number systems in our practical affairs.   
In a sense, Bloor sees the various philosophies of mathematics (Platonism, 
empiricism, formalism, logicism) as formulating the reasons for (ideological) 
attachment to arithmetic that are implicit in everyday uses of arithmetic.  In contrast 
to Bloor, we have cast doubt on the idea that the use of arithmetic is underpinned by 
such quasi-philosophical doctrines. Whilst Rawls’ arguments distinguish between 
justifying an action under a practice and justifying a practice according to a moral 
principle, they neither suggest nor entail that engagement within a practice (and 
justification within it) requires or depends upon any justification of the whole practice 
itself. The practice of punishment may be installed and running without need for 
further justification than that which comes with the practice itself.  Request for further 
justification might be relevant for other ‘offices’ (e.g., legislators or philosophers), but 
not necessary for ordinary practitioners. 
Conclusion 
We have presented Rawls as highlighting – in a very similar way to the almost 
simultaneous projects of Harold Garfinkel (1967, 2002) and Peter Winch (1964, 1990 
[1958]) – the extent to which society is, so to speak, a self-describing enterprise.  In 
our view, the argument of these authors could be summarised as saying that for an 
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extensive range of the problems that puzzle social scientists perhaps the first, and 
largely unsatisfied, requirement is to ensure that the practices under consideration are 
correctly specified, which involves in extensive part understanding how the self-
descriptive capacities of a practice operate.  The ‘perhaps’ marks the idea that the 
satisfaction of this requirement may be sufficient and may – as we have tried to show 
in the case of arithmetic – dissolve the supposed sociological problem of explanation 
rather than open the way for it. 
This line of argument, however, has often been criticized on the ground that this 
seems to presuppose that practices are therefore incorrigible, i.e., that sociologists (or 
anyone else for that matter) perforce have simply to assent to the legitimacy of 
engaging in a practice because, to borrow Wittgenstein’s phraseology, “this language 
game is played”.5  
We take Rawls’ main contribution in “Two concepts of rules” for social science to lie 
in highlighting the importance of strongly distinguishing between challenging 
someone within a practice or about the practice.  Bloor’s number wheel example is 
not a challenge to calculations made with our default arithmetic (the correct change to 
a ten pound note to an item priced £1.84 is still £8.16), but only to the supposed 
‘justifications’ for insisting that 2 + 2 must equal 4 (or that 10.00 – 1.84 must equal 
8.16).  However, this challenge is shown to be ineffective because it treats the 
justification of moves within the practices of default arithmetic as if they presuppose 
some ultimate justification of that system. The system of default arithmetic is 
conventional, but that does not entail that 2 + 2 = 4 is an optional element within it, 
for, as a constitutive rule, it is definitive of that system.   Our line of argument does 
not legislate on the general possibility of calling any given practice into question, but 
points to some of the difficulties arising in cases where the practice’s rules are 
constitutive and this fact is disregarded.  We have argued that the fact that many 
people might insist that 2 + 2 must equal 4 should be seen as an indication that they 
                                                 
5 “Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a ‘proto-
phenomenon’.  That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.” (Wittgenstein, 
1953, §654). 
Page 28 of 29 
Greiffenhagen, C. and W. Sharrock (2009). Two concepts of attachment to rules. Journal of Classical 
Sociology 9 (4), 405-427. 
 
take the expression to be one posed within our ‘default’ arithmetic, rather than as 
evidence of any foundationalist (ideological) attachment to that system. 
Operating ‘within’ a practice and reflecting ‘about’ a practice are not the same thing, 
since they are done under the auspices of different ‘offices’ and, as Rawls (1995, p. 
11) points out: “Until one knows these things one doesn’t know what the institution is 
whose justification is being challenged […]”. Whilst in Rawls’ case it is important to 
keep separate the offices of judge (who is operating within current law) and legislator 
(who may reflect upon, and even change, current law), in the case of mathematics it is 
important to distinguish between questions which can make sense to an everyday user 
operating within a particular arithmetic (such as “Do you have to say ‘4’ is the correct 
answer to ‘What does 2 add 2 make?’”) and questions that arise about a particular 
arithmetic (e.g., puzzlements about the philosophical, historical or sociological 
significance of the fact that there is a plurality of heterogeneous number systems).  
Awareness of Rawls’ thoughts on the nature of practices can still contribute to the 
elimination of these latter kinds of puzzlement and may be helpful not only with 
respect to understanding mathematics but many other practices as well.  
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